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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals .of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2399 
CAROLYN McNEIR, Appellant, 
versus 
BURR01rVS l\ifoNEIR, Appellee. 
PETITION FOR AN APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Chief Jw;tice and Justices of the Supreme 
O.ourt of Appeals of Vir,qinia: 
Your petitioner, Carolyn McN eir, respectfully represents 
that she is ag·grieved by the decree entered in the Chancery 
Cause of Carolyn l\foNeir, Complainant 1.,. Burrows McNeir, 
defendant, in the Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Virginia, 
on the 7th day of June, 1940, whe-reunder the said defend-
ant's demurrer to the complainant's bill of complaint was 
sustained and said bill of complaint dismissed. 
PLEADINGS. 
Appel1ant filed her bill of complaint in the Circuit Court 
of Fauquier .County wherei_n it was prayed that she be 
granted a divorce a vinculo rn,afri'lnonii from the appellee and 
that she be awarded a proper sum in alimony. The appellee 
filed his demurrer to said bill of complaint which was sus-
tained upon all of the three grounds assigned and the bill of 
complaint was dismissed. 
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2• •STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
There has· been no evidence ta.ken or submitted in this 
cause, the demurrer having been sustained and the bill of 
complaint dismissed. The averments of the bill of complaint, 
together with all exhibits filed therewith must, there.fore, be 
taken as true. 
Briefly stated, the following are the facts averred in the 
bill of complaint: 
On July 6th, 1912, the appellant and appellee were legally 
married. The last place of marital domicile was Fauquier 
County, Virginia. The appellee had 1been and was for a 
period of more than one year prior to the commencement of 
this suit a bona fide resident and domiciliary of Fauquier 
County. The appellee was guilty of gToss cruelty such as to 
constitute grounds for divorce, and induced the appeJlant to 
leave his bed and board and to go to Reno, Nevada, for the 
purpose of obtaining a divorce against him, which action on 
his part constituted a wilful desertion of the appellant with-
out justification. The appellant went to Reno for the sole 
purpose of obtaining this divorce, and without any intention 
of becoming domiciled within the .State of Nevada. After 
the divorce was instituted in N eva.da the appellant changed 
her mind about. obtaining· the divorce and .attempted a recon-
ciliation with the a.ppellee. The off er of reconciliation was 
rejected and the appellee, by false and fr~udulent threats, 
misrepresentations and duress induced her to continue the 
proceedings for divorce. • 
On February 4th, 1936, the divorce was granted by the 
Nevada Court. . 
3* *On May 9th, 1936, the appellee married one, Helen 
Harper, who, was a resident of Washingion, District of 
Columbia. 
The appellant is now destitute and without means of ade-
quate support and the appellee is financially able to con-
tribute to her support . 
.AS:SIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
The appellant assigns as error the sustaining of the de-
murrer by the Court on each of the three grounds thereof, 
and states these assignments as follows: · 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. l. 
3 
The C oitrt erred in sustaining the demitrrer on the ground 
that the bill of complaint shows on its face that the appellant 
should be denied the consideratfon of a coitrt of eqiiity be-
cause of the clean hands docfrine. 
The a.ppellee took the . position, which was sustained by 
the Court below, that although the Nevada decree of divorce 
may be void for want of jurisdiction, the appellant here 
should not be heard to assert such fact because she was a party 
to a fraud practiced upon the Nevada Court; the theory be-
ing that. she must have testified in the Nevada Court that she 
was domiciled within that. State. 
In the first place, no a.verment.s of the bill would indicate 
that the appellant, herself, knowingly practiced any fraud 
upon the Nevada Court. ·we have no transcript of the testi-
n;iony upon which the Court ba.sed its conclusfon that it had 
jurisdiction over the person of its complainant or over the 
marital status. It is true that it is averred in the ·bill that 
the divorce was obtained through false and fraudulent mis-
representations a.nd testimony. (See paragraph XIV of 
4 * the Bill.) *From this bare averment it is not fair to 
assume tha.t such fraudulent misrepresentations and tes-
timonv were made and g·iven hy the complainant herself. 
This Court is fully a.wa.re of t1Je practical situation which 
exists in the Nevada Courts in divorce cases. It is common 
knowledge that a residence of only six weeks is required. 
The g-rounds of divorce are numerous and the Courts do not 
question them very acutelv. Many persons in Virginia and 
other· states each year make the Journey to Reno to obtain 
a divorce, simply because the Virginia Courts are more strict 
in their requirements of proof and because an absolute di-
vorce may be obtained immediately without any restrictions 
as to a hasty remarriaQ;e. As we understand it., the six weeks 
residence under the N eva.da statute is sufficient noon whicl1 
the Court mav base its conclusion that the complainant is 
domiciled in tlmt Sta.te. If it. 8hould be true that our ap-
pellant testified in the Nevada Court that she was a domi-
ciliary of tha.t State, tl1is Court well knows that laymen gen-
erally have no conception of the legal or technical definitions 
of the terms domicile and residence. "\Ye. tberef ore, respect-
fully submit. that there is not.hinA" in the ·bill of complaint to 
RllOW that the appellant was· guilty of any COllduct which 
would justify the Court in refusing her prayer for equitable 
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relief on the ground that she did not come into Court with 
clean hands. 
If we should assume, for the purposes of this argument, 
that the appellant's hands are unc.lean and that relief should 
be denied her on that score., then we should have a most pe-
culiar anomaly. Admitting the Nevada decree to be void, our 
appellant would be the only person who would not. be per-
mitted to raise the question of its validity. The Common-
wealth of Virginia could raise the question in a prosecution 
against the appellee for bigamy. (See Corvin v. Common-
wealth, 131 Va. 649; 108 S. E. 651.) If the appellee is not 
5 * barred 1beca use of his unclean *ha.nds, he could raise the 
point. The children of this marriage might be permitted 
to raise the point in the event of the intestacy of their father 
in reg·ard to their inheritance of his property. It is well 
settled that decrees of divorce may be attacked collaterally 
where it is shown that the Court granting such divorce had 
no jurisdiction. 
We find no Virginia case in which this exact question has 
been treated, but there are several well known principles 
which to us seem applicable. In every divorce suit, where 
any question involves the marital status of citizens of Vir-
ginia, the Commonwealth is a silent party. It is interested 
in the promotion of the continued married life of all of its 
citizens. The united family is one of the bases upon which 
our system. of free government has been built. The State is 
interested in the stability of the marital status, as well as 
the interests and legitimacy of t.he children involved. 
In the case of Heflin,qer v. He/linger (136 Va. 289; 118 
S. E. 316), ,Justice· Burks in a strong opinion stated the in-
terest of the Commonwealth in the marital status of its citi-
zens. ,vhile not exactly in point that case may well be cited 
as a.ut11ority against the a.pplicat.ion of tl1e clean hands doc-
trine in the instant case. There the Court had before it the 
questioi1 as to whether it should apply the clean hands doc-
trine where the complainant sought to annul a marriage con-
tracte(J by llim in violation of the statute prohibiting his re-
marriage within six months after a. divorce a vinculo had 
been ~;ranted him. There was no question but that his hands 
were unclean and that he was "in pari delicto''. 
Justice Burks disagreed with the weight of American a.u-
tl10rity that. the guilty party is barred from suit for the an-
nulment of a bigamous marri~ge because of. his unclean 
hands. He cited with approval English authority that 
6* the clean bands *doctrine is not 'applicable in such cases, 
the state or crown, as the case may be, being interested. 
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']his same principle has been applied as to incestuous mar-
riages. .. 1'. 
If the-. State. is interested in the dissolution of ·void·. mar-
riages, why should not this be true with respect to void di.., 
vorces obtained by her citizens in other 8.tates with inten-
tion: to evade her laws 1 Should the clean hands doctrine 
apply where the State itself may raise the question and where 
other parties and t4e public generally are concerned T We 
submit that the State is interested in the instant case, not 
only. in the· marital- status of. the parties in the instant case1 
but also of the appellee and the woman whom he married three 
months after the divorce was granted, and all of those who 
leave thQ bountlaries of Virginia and obtain divorces in courts 
lacking jurisdiction. 1 ._ 
This question has been raised in other jurisdictions not 
on the g;rounds of the clean hands doctrine, but under the 
principle of estoppel in pais. We find the authorities divided 
on the subject. 
It is the general rule that, ,while a void decree or· judg-
ment cannot 'be leg·alized by act of the parties, they may 
nevert.l1eless be· estopped to assert its inYalidity to their own 
advantage, on ·the -theory that they have enjoyed its fruits. 
(Freeman on ,Judgments, .Section 1438.) 
The Courts of some states- have applied this rule in cases 
where a. person seeks to attack a divorce decree for lack of 
jnrisdiction ,because the complainant: was not domiciled within 
the State wl1ere the divorce was obtained. 
(19 0. J. 378) '• 
Bledsoe v. Sea.mam,, 77 Kan. 679 ·; 95 Pa.c: 576. 
C1.trry v. C1.wry (App. D. C.), 79 F. (2) 1172. 
7• *It is. to ·be noted that in these cases the Court did 
--, : not consider the <JU es Hon a.s to any duress or coercion 
practiced by: the, husband in the obtaining of the divorce. In 
th~ .curry ~.ase. ( suv·ra) the Court did not in: its opinion con-
sider. whether. or,· not a. divorcP.· suit.. was, disting'Uishable- from 
any, consent1 dec'fe¢. Ther<? ,vas no consideration of. the in-
terests of the State or sdciety, a.nd we find the Court say-
ing: . 
• ;, I I • t ' 
·f -'Awl. of course, tl1is salut.arv princ.iple is of p:eneral- ap-
nlication. not-confined to-the netive parties in matters of di., 
vor.ce, as in the, cases above, cit<?d, for it can never lie with a 
Htig·ant either by passive consent. or by affirmative action~ 
t.o lead a court to find a. fact justified and fit to be carried 
6 Sup1 eme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
into judgment, and then to contend in another court that the 
same fact at the same time and within his own knowledge, 
was otherwise and competent to support a contrary judg-
ment. 
''For a consent decree, within the purview of the plead-
ings and the scope of the issues, is valid and binding upon 
all parties consenting, open neither to direct appeal nor col~ 
lateral attack. '.A. fortiori, neither party can deny its effect 
as a part of a subsequent suit on any claim included in the 
decree.' Nashville, etc., Railway C101npany v. United States, 
113 U. S. 261, 266, 5 S. Ct. 460, 462, 28 L. Ed. 971. And so, 
even where the consent decree is of an interlocutorv nature. 
In i·e Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 28 
S. Ct. 219, 52 L. Ed. 403; Parit~h v. McGowan, 39 App. D. C. 
184, 201. '' . 
On the other hand we find abundant authority to support 
the proposition that where the wife obtains a divorce which 
is invalid because of want of jurisdiction, she is not estopped 
to assert the invalidity thereof in a. collateral attack, if it be 
shown that the husband throug}1 intimidation and fraud in-
duced her to institute and prosecute the suit for divorce. 
Hopkins v. Hopkins (1\fo.), 165 So. 414. 
Denni.~ v. Harris. 179 (Ia.) 121; 15:-l N. W. 343. 
Holling.~head v. Hollingshead, 91 (N. J.) Eq. 261 110 Atl. 
19. 
In the Hopkins case (supra) the Court had before it the 
identi()a.l ouestions involved in the instant case. *The 
8* Court) in its opinion said: 
'' There are three parties to a marriage contract-the par-
ties marryin~ and society-so, the doct.rine of estoppel con-
cerns not onlv the parties to the marria.ge contract, but also 
the public. The' contract cannot he dissolved either by agree-
ment or by collusive uroc.eeding·s in court. Gurley v. Gorman., 
1:-l7 Miss. 210. 102 So. 65. Can anpellant rely on estoppel 
when be. and he alone, is responsible for the facts that con-
stitute the estoppel, We tliink not. .An estopµel against' 
an esto1mel destrovs eaeli otJ)(w. 10 R. C. L. S. 146~ p. 841; 
21. C .• J. 1110: Barrin,qer v. Danernheim, 127 La. 679, 53 So. 
923. Lord Coke expressed it in this language : Two estoppels 
destrov ear11 ot11er or 'set the matter a.t large', note to 5 
Ann. Cas. 845." 
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In the case of Hollingshead v. llollin.,qshead (supra), the 
Court applied this rule, saying·: 
'' The foreign dec.ree, as has been pointed out, is not merely 
voidable but void, for lack of jurisdiction, and is one which 
our statute savs 'shall be of no force or effect in this state.' 
Bearing in mind the fundamental principle that the matri-
:,;nonial status is a matter of concern, not me.rely to the two 
spouses, but equally so to the state, it seems to me that th~ 
Legislature has laid, down, by the statutory provisions afore-
said, a definite pronouncement of the public policy of this 
state, the result of which must be to preclude the considera-
tion of questions as to whether or not one of the parties is 
estopped from setting up its void character.'' 
vVe submit that regardless of whether the appellant was 
guilty of fraud in the obtaining· of the Nevada decree she is 
not estopped from asserting· the· invalidity thereof here, when 
it is clearly alleged in the hill that she was induced to pro-
cure the divorce by the coercion, misrepresentations, duress 
and fraud of her husband, the appcllee. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2. 
The C o,wrt erred in sustainin,q the demu,rrer on the ground 
that relief .~hould be denied the a.ppellwnt because of her 
laches. 
9* • An interval of fours years elapsed between the en-
trance of the N eva.da. dec.ree of divorce and the institu-
tion of this suit. It is urged by the appellee tha.t the bill, on 
its face, discloses t.Jia.t the appellant had been guilty of '' in-
excusable ]aches and is now estopped 'from seeking any re-
lief in the Virginia Court''. In support of this position the 
appellee relies on the decisions of three cases, namely: 
Cameron v. Canieron CW. Va.), ~.50 S. E. 225. 
Dry v. Rice, 147 Va. 331; 137 S. Ft 4-73. 
Horfoett v. Hodnett, 163 Va. 644; 177 S. E. 106. 
In all these ca.se.s the complainant was denied relief in 
suits to s~t aside decrees of divorce on the · g-round that 
lacl1es barred the claim. 
In tlle first place the element. of time is unimportant. The 
Virginia statute of limitations with respect to suits involving 
fraud provides a period of five years from the date of t.11e 
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fraud discovered. Certainly the lapse of time in this case 
under the maxim that equity follows the law as to limita-
tion would not be temied la.ches. In Lile 's Notes on Equity 
,T urisprudence, page 22, we find the general rule of Laches 
stated as follows : 
''The rule of laches referred to in the paragraph num-
bered (3) aJbove, is, that althoug·h equity, in such cases, is 
not bound by the statute of limitations, it will yet refuse 
relief to a plaintiff who has knowingly or ueg·ligently slept 
on his rig·hts, as the result of which enforcement of the 
claim is likely to produce a failure of justice hy reason of 
the loss of evidence-as by the death or forgetfulness of 
witnesses, or by loss or destruetion of papers. 
'' But where, on the other hand, none of these reasons ex-
ist-as where the plaintiff was ignorant ·of·-!his ~rights, with-
out his fault, or the justice ·of the clahh 11ests qn written docu-
ments, or in tJ1e well authenticated admissions of the defend-
ant-then equity may enforce the ciaim in spite of the long 
lapse of time, unless the· circuinstan~es of the delay indicate 
an abandonment of the cli.dm~'' · ~ ~= · 
10* *'In the cases of Oam.er~n v. CarnAron and Hodnett V, 
Hodnett (both su.pra), the renl reason for the· bar of 
la.ches seems to be that the right.s of in~ocent third persons 
have been involved. namely, the wife of a. remarriage· on the 
part of the husband after the decree was granted. In these 
cases tl1e nuestion came before the courts after the introduc-
tion of, an. test.imony in the case. from which th(.\ courts had 
the benefit of all or' the surrounding facts and circumstances 
upon wllicl1 they based their opini.ons tha.t the respective 
complainants were guilty of inexeusaible laches. From the 
testimo11y the courts were also able to ascertain whether or 
not the rig·hts of an innocent third party were involved. In 
this respect the court in Cameron v. 'Ca·n1-eron, (supra), said: 
''Her ma.rriage did not occur until nearly a year and a 
half after .the ent.ry of the annulment decree; it therefore 
eannot be termed. a 'hasty marriage'. 
"We are of the opinion that the delay of plaintiff in in-
i.:;ti.tutirnr tl1is suit was unreasonable under the circumstances 
and tl1at t11e decree of the lower court refus~ng her relief must 
he affirmed.". . . . . · · 
We think it we·u to q1~ote ·.tllC. concurring opinion of ,J us- . 
t.ices Maxwen, woods and Lits i~ the Saip.e case : 
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'' I concur in the . result because I think the rights of 
Cameron's present wife are paramount to the rights of Rose 
l\L Cameron, whose standing· in this proceeding as to the 
present wife is destroyed by laches. "\Vere it not for the 
fact that the prese~t wife is innocent of this whole affair ~nd 
a reversal of the circuit court's decree would be calamitous 
to her, I would· favor· such reversal and a setting aside of 
the decree of annulment obtained by Cameron against tp.e 
plaintiff, as, in niy opinion, it is clearly apparent from the 
evidence that she was misled a.nd imposed upon by her hris-
·band in connection with that matter. I am authorized by 
Judg·es Woods and Lits to say that they concur in this note." 
11 * *In tp.e Hodnett case ( su,pra), .Justice Chinn gave 
great weight to fhe fact that Mrs. Hodnett '' had know I~ 
edge of the defendant's intention to marry Miss Hopper 
several months before the event took phwe, and, the ref ore, 
had ample oppo1;tunity to bring· this suit to avoid placing the 
latter· in the unfortunate situation she would occupy in case 
the divorce decree is declared invalid. Mes. Hodnett's con-
duct in this respect co11stitut.es such lac.hes under the' circum-
stances as bars l1er right to assail t.lle decree of divorce 011 
the grounds alleged.'' 
In the c.ase of Dry v. Rice, ( s-u.pra), we find no discussion 
of the facts, the court. saying that the appellee wa.s precluded 
by his laches. 
We submit. that the court was not justified in finding from 
the face of the bill that the appellant should be barred by 
her }aches. At lea.st, the court. should have permitted or re-
quired the takh)g· of testimony in order to ascertain whether 
the rig·hts of an innocent third party are involved in this 
case. In fact., it appears from the face of the bill, that the 
third party in this case married the appellce almost exactly 
three months after the entrance of the Nevada. decree. Can 
the court say that she is a.n inn~cent perty~ Certainly not 
under the test in the Cameron case (supra), where the court 
laid g-reat stress on the fact that the third party did not 
enter info a '' hasty marriage''. Certainly not under the test 
laid down hv Justice Chinn in the Hodnett case ( sitpra), 
where Mrs. Hodnett lived in tlie same Town with the inno-
cent third party ancl knew for more than a. year prior to the 
remarria.g-e tl1at tlie same was intended and did not warn the 
third party. 
12• · *It would seem to us that we may say that the third 
party in the instant case entered into a hasty marriag·e 
or that she had knowledge of the a.ppellee 's intention to in-
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duce the appellant to divorce him, and· it seems reasonable 
to presume that she may have been a party to the whole af-
fair. She must have known the appellee prior to the time 
of the divorce, and in view of thl~ hasty marriage·, it would 
seem to us that the court would desire to i~quire into her 
relationship with the appellee prior thereto. 
This question was carefully treated in t.he case of Hollings-
head v. Hollingshead, (supra), in which we find the court 
saying: 
"In the present case it does not appear that the wife 
knew of the contemplated marriage, ·and it occurred but a 
few months after the decree. It does not appear that the 
sooond wife was innocent or ig·norant. The mere fact of 
there having· been a subsequent marriag·e, especially when it 
took place shortly after the foreign divorce, does not im-
press me as sufficient to raise a countervailing equity. As 
is pointed out in 1J!Vatkinson v. Tf' atkinson, 67 N. J. Eq. 142, 
at page 157, 58 Atl. 384, the second spouse ought to be held 
to inquiry in the case of a decree of a state foreign to the 
usual residence of the parties. See, also, Clayto1i v. Clayton, 
59 N. J. Eq. 310, 316, 44 .A.tl. 840, K e1nvson v. Kempson, 61 
N. J. E·q. 303, 330, 48 Atl. 244, and 9 R. C. L. S. 262. '' 
As a practical matter, we wonder when the precise moment 
occurred in the iusta.nt case when the appellant's claim would 
be ha rred 1by lac.hes. Iu the Virgfoia and vV est Virginia 
cases cited above it. would appear that the time would arrive 
immediately after the remarriage. If that rule is applied to 
this ca.se the appellant. would have been compelled to have 
asserted her rig-lits within three months after the date of the 
d.eeree. After tl10 remarriage it would appear that the length 
of time elapsing would be relatively unimportant, and 
13* there would be no re-ason to *bar the appellant's claim 
simply because a period of four years had elapsed. 
There is no showing· l1ere tha.t the appellant knew that the 
appellee was about to remarry, and we think that she should 
be permitted to assume that he would not remarry within a 
decent. interval. The time usually observed by persons in 
like situation is a year or more, and we think that the appel-
lant in tl1is ca.se should have been permitted to assume that 
the appellee would not remarry within a year. Her case 
would have been far different. had the appellee waited a 
year; and in all likelihood the court would feel justified in 
barring her claim for laches if she did not assert it within 
that period of time. 
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We submit that in this case it does not appear on the 
face of the bill that the rights of an innocent third party 
are involved; tha.t it does appear that the third party and the 
appellee contracted a hasty marriag·e after the Nevada di-
vorce; and that, the ref ore, there is no gTound upon which 
the appellant's rig·hts should be denied her on the theory 
that she was g11ilty of ]aches. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3. 
The Court erred ·in. sustaining the dem.urrer on the ground 
that the bill of complaint shows .on its face that the Nevada 
decree of di'l,orce is reg1t.lar in all respects and is entitled to 
full faith and credit in the courts of Virginia. 
This question has been so well settled· that we shall deal 
with the same hut briefly. 
This court in the cases of Corvin, v. Commonwealth (supra.) 
and Hillmphreys v. Strong, 139 Va. 146, recognized the prin-
ciple tha.t states are not required under the full faith and 
credit laws of the Constitution to reco!nlize a divorce decree 
obtained in the court of another state ..... where such court had 
no jurisdietion a.nd that sueh decree might collaterally be 
attacked. 
14* *There is so much authority for this principle that 
we shall not burden the Court with further citation. 
CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioner respectfully contends that the said decree 
of the lower Court should be reversed, and that the cause 
8llould be remanded to the Circuit Court of Fauquier County 
for further proceedings, for the foregoing- reasons assigned, 
and petitioner respectfully pra.ys tha.t she may be awarded 
an appeal pending the review of the record by this Court, 
that a writ of sitpersedeas may be forthwith awarded her and 
that. said decree may be reversed and annulled. 
A copy of this petition has been delivered to Walter H. 
Robertson a..nd Clrn.rles G. Stone, Esquires, a.t Warrenton, 
Virginia, w}10 were eounsel appearing for Burrows McN eir 
in the trial of this cause. This petition will be filed witl1 




"'\VEA VER, AR,MSTRONG AND MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for petitioner. 
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15* *I, Elliott :Marshall, an attorney practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby cer-
tify that in my opinion there is error in the decree of the 
7th day of June, 1940, of the Circuit Court of Fauquier 
,County, Virginia, in favoi· of Burrows McNeir, defendant in 
~aid cause, as set forth· in the foregoing annexed petition, 
J:o.r: which the same should be reviewed and reversed by the 
.Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, and' I further hereby 
certify that my address is Froµt Royal, Virginia. 
Given under my hand this October 4th, 1940. 
ELLIOTT MARSH.ALL, 
Attorney. 
16* *We, Walter H. Robertson and Charles G. Stone, 
Esquires, do hereby acknowledge the receipt of a copy 
of the foregoing petition for ~m appeal and a copy of the 
record in that -certain' cause in chancery lately pending in 
the Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Virginia., under the 
style of Carolyn McNeir v. Burrows McNeir,. and we also 
hereby' accept notice of the filing of said petition for appeal 
and the record in said cause witJ1 Justice George L. Brownin~ 
at · brang·e, Virginia, on the 5th day of . October, 1940. c.: 
Given under our hands this October 5th, 1940. 
Rec ~d 10-5-40. 
WALTER H. ROBERTSON, 
CHAS. G. STONE, 
Counsel for A.ppellee. 
GEORGE L. BROWNING. 
N oyember 29, 19·40. Appeal and supersedeas awarded by 
the' court. Bond $300. 
. ' ! 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Circuit Court of Fauquier County. 
Among· the records and ,proceedings of said Court, are the 
following: ·· 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that heretofore, to-wit: on the 
18 ·Ma)(, ;\1949, came Ca:r,-oly,n :¥~~eir- anq :filed her bill in 
chancery against Burrows Mc.N eir, in· the following words: 
To the Honorable J. R. H. Alexander, Judge of the Circuit 
Court of Fauquier County; Yirginia.: 
Your complainant, Carolyn :McN eir respectfuliy represents : 
. l: ( :I. 
That she is now a resident and domiciliary of the City of 
New York, State of New York. 
_) . II. .· ) . IL 
I 
· That the defendanf; Ilurrows 1\foNeir, is now and has.been 
for a period of :Qior~ than one year prior to the commence-
ment of this suWa brJ1ia fide resident and don:iioiliaity. of the 
County of Fauquier, ·State of Virginia. 
III. 
That on or a.bout tlie 6th day of .July, 1912, the complain-
ant and defendant wer~· leg·ally married in the· Oity of Canaan 
a1,d.State of Oonnectict1t, afi will appear from•a certified copv 
of the record o.f said marriage which is herewith filed marked 
complainant's exl1ibit. No. 1, and prayed to be read as a part 
hereof. . 
IV. 
·That'. ~ft.er said marriage corilplaina:nt and de-
page 2 ~ fenda.nt commenced cohabitation and took up their 
residence~ domicile and place of abode in the County 
of Fauquier, State of Virginia, where they continuously main-
14 S~preme Court ~f ApP,eals of Virginia 
tained their marital domicile for more than one year prior 
to on or about the first day of December, 1935. 
v. 
That as a result of said marriage two children were born 
to the. co:tn,pJainant and defendant, namely, Meda l\foN eir and 
George ~foNeir, both of whom are siti ju,ris. 
VI. 
That during the time of the marital cohabitation the de-
fendant was g·uilty of various and numerous acts of gross 
cruelty to the complainant, in that he did harshly and un-
justly criticise and abuse her, and, on numerous occasions 
did .insult and embarrass her before her friends and ac-
quaintances, all of whicll resulted in great and grievous 
;mental and physical embarrassment, harm and disquietude 
on the part of the complainant; and that at various times 
from 1927 to 1935 the def enda.nt attempted to induce the 
complainant to divorce him. 
VII. 
That on or about the first day of December, 1935, the com-
plainant, as a result of said acts of -eruelty on the part of 
the defendant, and as a result of his repeated suggestions 
and inducements, entered into an oral agreement with the 
defendant, whereby the parties agreed to separate, and the 
complainant, upon consideration of the promise of the de-
fendant to pay ber the sum of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) together with all costs and attorney's 
page 3 ~ fees of a diyorce in Reno, N eyada, and, after such 
divorce, to continue to contr~bute to the support 
and maintenance of the complainant, agreed to leave the bed 
and bontd of the defendant and to visit the City of Reno, 
Nevada, for tha.t sole purpose, and to there obtain a divorce 
a vilnculo ntatrfrnonii from the defendant on the ground of 
cruelty. 
VIII. 
Tlrnt, pursuant to said agreement with the defendant, and 
in reliance upon l1is promise that he would contribute to her 
support and maintenance after such divorce was granted the 
compla.ina.i1t did on ot about the first ~ay of December, 1935, 
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leave the defendant at their said residence and domicile in 
the County of Fauquier, State of Virginia, and did go to 
Reno, Nevada, for the sole purpose of there obtaining a di-
vorce a vincitlo matrimonii and without any intention of re-
maining permanently within the State of Nevada; and that 
on the fourth day of February, 1936, the complainant insti-
tuted a suit against the defendant for divorce a vinc1do 
matrimonii upon the grounds of cruelty in the .Second Judicial 
District Court of the State of Nevada in a'nd for the County 
of Washoe. .. 
IX. 
That after her arrival in Reno, Nevada, and on or about 
the 8th day of J a.nuary, 1936, after mature reflection and 
reconsideration of the said agreement between herself and 
the defendant, the complainant decided that she would dis- . 
continue her efforts to obtain a divorce in Nevada, and im-
media.tely communicated · with the defendant, advising him 
of such decision and offering to ·become reconciled 
page 4 ~ and to resume ma.rital cohabitation with him at their 
said marital domicile, which offer the defendant 
refused, and did, bY false and fraudulent threats, misrepre-
sentations. cJuress a.nil other mea.ns of persuasion, induce her 
to proceed with her divoree. in Nevada, and again did repre-
sent. to the complainant and did promise her, only on the 
P-0ndition pre<'edent tlutt she should obtain said divorce in 
Nevada. that he would contribute t.o her support and main-
tenance thereafter. 
X. 
Tha.t, a.s a result of suc.h tl1reats, misrepresentations and 
duress on t.he 1Ja.rt. of t.he defendant, the complainant allowed 
the suit. tben pcndiuµ: for a. divorce in Reno, Nevada, to con-
tinue. and 011 t]1e fourth day of February. 1936. a dec.ree of 
divorce a vinrulo ma.frim,o·nii was entered bv · the Second 
.Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada.· in and for the 
Countv of Washoe. as will appear from a certified copy of 
such decree whic]1 is herewith filed, marked complainant's 
exhibit No·. 2 and prayed to be read as a part hereof. 
XI. 
ThRt the comnlainant. left the State of Nevada on or about 
tl1e fifth day· of February, 1936, after the entrance of the 
16 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
~aid de,(}r(,3e· of divorce, and that she has never returned to the 
State of Nevada since that day. 
XII. 
l .. 
That on ,o:r about the ninth day of May, 1936, in the City of 
, ! ._. . Waf?hi:q.gton, Distriet of Columbia, the d~fendant 
page 5 ~ went :through. a marriag·e ce.remony with '.o~e: Helen 
, : ~ , .. Harper; _and. is now, living with her as man and wife 
in the County of Fauquier, State of Virginia. 
XIII. 
. That:. the. def endant,'s·. refusal of complainant's -offer of 
r~cQn~Hi~tipn. a.s set forth in ·par:agrapl;i; lX ·of -this bill ~f 
compla~r,.t. constituted · a wilful. dese.rt.ion and abandonment 
of the complainant without justification. 
XIV. 
,·,,,... . ., . . 
. i~~at the~ S&id decree -of divorce .entered by- the Second 
tJuqicia.l. District Co-µrt of Nevada. in and for. the -County of 
W ash<>,e, .is null, void and of ·no .effect by reason of the fact 
th~-t ,the, Court -had. acquir~d no. jurisdiction. ovel~ the marital 
Ht~tµs o:£ the pal'ties, .neither of whom were ever actually 
d~mic.\led within the boundaries of the Court's jurisdiction, 
a11d .~.~id· ~divorce .. having been obtained through false and 
fraudulent misrepresentations and testimony. 
xv. 
That the defendant's sa1a promises and representations 
th~t h~. ~ould oontribute to the support. and maintenance -of 
tb~-~olllp1ain~n~ .after the obtaining of the said divorce were 
false .a.nd fraudulent at their ~nception and ,were mad~ by 
him: for :the sole purpose,. of . inducing· the complainant to 
q~,1;i:yc1~nt .. bjs frauc,lq.lent, d,esign. to'.-obtain the said ,divorce, 
an<l,.,at. their. .in~~pt.jon tl}.e dqf~ndant. had no. intention of 
fijlfilling· qr-,.pcrfo1~ming-,th.e, snlll:e;; a.nd that, :since thef -said 
dhmr.c~,,a}U1~mgb.th~ complainant. has been and is in destitute 
financial ci_rc.µnist&.nces an~\.l1as. QP. nruner.Qus times and oc-
casions importuned and requested the defendant 
pag·e 6 ~ that lie confribute tQi per support, in fulfillment of 
said promises, yet, wholly failing in his duty, and 
ign,9,r,h,g s.aid, promis~s. t4e. ,def_endant has,. refused and -.fail~d 
to keep tl1e same or to in any way contribute to the complain-
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ant's support, and this, despite the fact that the defendant 
is financially able and capable of so doing. 
WHEREFORE, being without remedy save in a court of 
Equity where such matters are properly cognizable the com-
plainant prays: 
I. 
That the said Burrows McN eir may be made a party de-
fendant to this bill of complainant and required to .answer 
the same !hut not under oath the oath being hereby specifically 
waived; . . 
II. 
That proper process may be issued; 
III. 
Tha.t the Court may enter its decree declaring said decree 
of divorce of the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada 
in and for the County of Washoe,· to be null, void and of no 
effect on the ground that the said Court was without juris-
diction to gTa.nt. sucl1 divorce. 
IV. 
That the complainant ma.y be awarded a divorce a vi'l'l,culo 
niatri1nonii created by the said marriage on the ground or 
wilful desertion and abandonment of the complainant with-
out justification. 
v. 
That the Court may enter its decree awarding to 
page 7 } tl1e complainant. a. fair and proper sum in alimony 
for her support and maintenance. 
And that the complainant ma.y have such other and proper 
and general relief in the premises as to Equity might seem 
meet and just. 
And c.omplainant will ever pray, etc. 
OAROLYN McNEIR. 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of V_irginia 
together with two exhibits therewith, in the following words: 
CONNECTICUT, STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Marriage License. 
Bureau of Vital 
Statistics 
Town of North Canaan 
I. Groom's name Burrows McNeir 1. Bride's name Carrie Conklin 
2. Age 30 2. Age 19 
3. Color White 3. Color White 
4. Occupation Farmer 4. Occupation None 
{ Town Washington 5. Birthplace State or Country D C 
6. His residence Millerton, N Y 
5. Birthplace { Town Millerton 
State of Country N Y 
6. Her residence Millerton, N Y 
7. Widowed Divorced 2d-3d { 
Single 
Divorced Marriage 2nd { 
Single 2d-3d 
7. Widow Single Marriage __ _ 
Divorced 
8. Name of Father George McNeir 8. Name of Father A. E. Conklin 
9. Maiden name 9. Maiden name 
of Mother Meta Burrows of Mother Alice Guernsey 
10. Supervision or control of Guardian l 0. Supervision or control of Guardian 
or Conservator ................. . or Conservator ................ . 
I, Burrows McNeir one of the persons named in this Marriage License, do solemnly 
swear that the statements therein made are true. 
Signed BURROWS McNEIR 
page 8 ~ Sworn to before me this 4th day of July 1912. 
Signed ALLYN FULLER Registrar. 
This Certifies, that the above-named parties have complied with the laws of 
Connecticut relating to a marriage license, · 
Dated July 4th 1912, 
Attest: ALLYN FULLER Registrar. 
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. 
I hereby Certify that Mr. Burrows McNeir and Miss Carrie Conklin the ·above-
named parties, were legally joined in marriage by me at North Canaan this 6th 
day of July 1912. 
Signed REV. PERCY R. FERRIS. 
Official capacity Pastor of West Side Baptist Church. 
Address 140 Urban St. 
Mt. Vernon, N Y 
I certify that this is a true copy of the certificate received for record. 
Attest, FRANK F. STEVENS, Registrar 
(Official Seal) 
Carolyn McNeir v. Burrows McNeir 
CONSENT OF PARENT OR GUARDIAN, 
To be filled in when either party is a minor. 
Millerton, N. Y. this 6th day of July 1912 
19 
I do hereby give my consent for the marriage of Carrie, my daughter, to Burrows 
McNeir 
MRS ALICE G. CONKLIN. 
This Certificate received for record this 6th day of July 1912. 
ALLYN FULLER, Registrar. 
p.age 9 } In the Second Judicial District Court of the State 
~f Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe,. 
FILED 
Carolyn McNeir, Plaintiff, 1'936 FEB-4-P. M., 2 :10 
v. E. H. BE'E,MER, Clerk 
Burrows McNeir, Defendant. By B. ELLSWORTH, 
Deputy 
FINDINGS OF 1F.AC'J', CONOLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
DECREE. 
BE IT RE:MEMBERED, That this ca.use came on regularly 
for trial this day before the Court, without a jury. The 
plaintiff appea.red in person and was rep.resented by her at-
torney, H. H. Atkinson, Esq. The defendant filed his an-
swer herein, and was represented by his attorney, -George A. 
Whiteley, Esq.· Such proceedings were thereupon had that 
the Court made and entered it.s decision in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant, conforming with which de-
cision, the Court herewith makes its findings of fact ecmclu-
sions of law and decree as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
1. Each, every and all the allegations vf plaintiff's com-
. plaint are true,. 
2. Tha.t the Court has jurisdiction of this cause of aetion 
and the parties thereto. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
1. That .p\aintiff is entitled to an absolute divorce from 
the defendant. 
page 10 ~ DECREE. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED Ai~D DE-
CREED: 
1. Tha.t the marriage heretofore· existing between the, plain-
tiff, Carolyn Mc.Neir, and the defendant, Burrows McNeir, 
be dissolved absolutely and forever, and the same hereby is 
dissolved accordingly, and the said parties are and each of 
them is hereby frued and released from the bonds of matri-
mony and all the duties and obligations thereof; and each of 
said parties is restored to the status of a single person. 
Done in Open Court this 4th day of February, 1936. 
THOMAS F. MORAN, 
District Judge. 
And on 5 June, 1940, the defendant filed his demurrer to 
said ibill in the following- words: 
DEMURRER. 
The defendant, Burrows McN eir, demurs to the Bill of 
Complaint exhibited against him in the Circuit Court of 
!Flauquier County by Carolyn McN eir, and says that the· same 
is not sufficient in law. 
Among the grounds of demurrer relied upon, defendant 
specifically assigns the following : · 
( 1) The Bill plainly shows that complainant is coming 
into court with unclean hands and is seeking to take advan-
tag·e of perjury committed in and fraud practiced upon the 
Reno, Nevada Court by the .complainant. 
(2) The Bill shows that complainant has been 
pag·e 11 ~ guilty of inexcusable laches and is now estopped 
from seeking any relief in the Virginia Courts. 
(3) The Bill shows on its face that the Nevada divorce · 
decree obtained in February, 1936, by the complainant, at 
her own instigation, is regular in all respects, and is entitled 
to full faith and credit in the courts of Virginia, and it does 
not lie in the mouth of the complainant to attack this decree 
in her favor. 
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And in said Court on 7 June, 1940, the following decree 
was entered: 
DECREE. 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the com-
plainant's Bill of Complaint and exhibits therewith duly 
filed; upon the defendant's demurrer in writing filed her~in 
on June 5, 1940; the cause having been matured; .docketed; 
and argued by consent of counsel for both parties this date 
upon said Bill with exhibits and defendant's demurrer there-
to. 
Upon consideration whereof, the court being of the opinion 
that the complainant's Bill should be dismissed upon each 
and all of the g·rounds set forth in the defendant's demurrer, 
doth hereby adjudge, order and decree that said demurrer 
in all respects be and the same is hereby sustained, to which 
ruling the complainant asks leave to file written grounds of 
exceptions to the ruling of the court within ten days from 
this date, which leave is granted. And upon further mo-
tion of the complainant for leave to file an 
page 12 ~ amended Bill of Complaint within 30 days from 
the date hereof, the court doth further order .that 
said leave be and tl1e same is hereby granted. 
I hereby certify that the foreg·oing pages contain the en-
tire record of the Chancery Cause lately pending in the Cir-
cuit. Court of Fauquier County, styled Carolyn McN eir v. 
Burrows McN cir, as requested by the attorney for the plain-
tiff. 
I further certify that the notice required by section 6339 
of the Code of "Virginia, has been given. 
Teste: 
Fee for this record 4.00. 
T. E. BARTENSTEIN, 
Clerk Circuit Court Fauquier 
County Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. W AT'l'S, C. C. 
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